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PENNSYLVANIA TENTATIVE TRUSTS:
PROBLEMS AND PROBLEM AREAS
DONALD S. Co-AN f
The general outlines of the law of tentative trusts are well settled
in Pennsylvania. By adopting the Totten trust doctrine,1 the courts
have defined the rights of the depositor during his lifetime and the bene-
ficiary following the death of the depositor.2 However, the application
of these principles is affected by the rights and duties of third parties
under state statutory and common law. This interaction suggests an
examination of Pennsylvania tentative trust law with respect to: (1)
claims against the trust account (by creditors, surviving spouse, and
taxing authorities) ; (2) rights, duties, and obligations of savings insti-
tutions; and (3) treatment of special groups (minors, incompetents,
and charities).
I. CLAIMS AGAINST THE TRUST ACCOUNT
A. Creditors' Rights
Funds in an "in trust" account may be reached after the death
of the depositor for the payment of his debts and the administrative
expenses of his estate, but only if the decedent "has not sufficient other
property which can be applied for these purposes." 3 It is equally clear
that the depositor's creditors can reach the trust account during his
lifetime.4
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I In 1933 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the New York rule as set
forth in In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904). Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa.
424, 169 Atl. 106 (1933); see Rodger's Estate, 374 Pa. 246, 97 A.2d 789 (1953);
Bearinger's Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A.2d 342 (1939) ; Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super.
93, 188 A.2d 209 (1936). But see Ingel's Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 180, 92 A.2d 881, 885
(1952) (dissenting opinion). Prior to 1933, Pennsylvania courts had formulated the
rule that the labelling of a bank account as a trust raises a presumption that a valid
trust is created. Rambo v. Pile, 220 Pa. 235, 69 Atl. 807 (1908) ; Arnold v. Macugnie
Say. Bank, 71 Pa. 287 (1872); Kelly v. General Fin. Co., 16 Pa. D. & C. 435 (C.P.
1931).
2 See, e.g., Scanlon's Estate, supra note 1; Krewson Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509,
36 A.2d 250 (1943) ; Gorgas Estate, 147 Pa. Super. 319, 24 A.2d 171 (1942) ; Fair-
weather Estate, 9 Chester 99 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959) ; Kowalenko Estate, 73 Mont-
gomery 523 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1951).
3 Rodger's Estate, 11 Fid. Rep. 645, 647 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1961), quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 58, comment d (1959); see 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 58.5,
at 497-98 (2d ed. 1956).
4 See Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super 452, 455, 36 A.2d
242, 243 (1944) ; Wagner Estate, 86 Pa. D. & C. 454 (Orphans' Ct. 1953) (dictum);
1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 58.5, at 497 (2d ed. 1956).
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At the death of the depositor, it seems obvious that the creditors
of the beneficiary can reach the property held in the trust account, since
the fund becomes the property of the named beneficiary at that time.5
While the depositor is living, creditors of a beneficiary of a tentative
trust have no present claim to the funds in the trust; 6 an attachment
of such a trust account during the life of the depositor by a creditor
of the beneficiary constitutes an interference with the right of the de-
positor to maintain control over the deposit.'
At least twice it has been held that in the event of insolvency of
the savings institution, the depositor may not set off the tentative trust
against debts owed by him to the bank.' Both cases are based on
the theory that a tentative trust is an actual trust until revoked, but
conflict sharply with the rule allowing creditors of the depositor to
reach the account even though he has not exercised his right of revoca-
tion. Theoretically, the conflict may be reconciled. In the case of the
depositor's creditors, it may be argued that it is the unrestricted con-
trol of the depositor over the account and not his property interest
therein which allows creditors to reach the fund; ' hence, it is not
wholly illogical to assert in setoff cases that the account is not the
property of the depositor.Y
Apart from such rules, it would be easy for the depositor to resort
to self-help, since his subjective intent forms the key to most problems
in this area." He could assert an irrevocable trust in cases in which
his creditors threatened 2 and a revocable trust subject to setoff in
cases where the bank became insolvent. Unfortunately, in trying to
avoid such manipulation, the courts have gone beyond the pale of fair-
ness. It seems inequitable to allow a creditor bank to reach the de-
posit, yet not permit the depositor his setoff against an insolvent bank
in identical accounts.
B. Rights of the Surviving Spouse
Whether the rights of a surviving spouse can be defeated by the
use of "in trust" bank accounts is important, because such accounts
5 Doubtless, however, the creditors of the depositor would have first claim to
the trust account
6Bankruptcy Act §70(a)(3), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a) (3) (1958).
7 Kelly v. General Fin. Co., 16 Pa. D. & C. 435 (C.P. 1931).
8 Kardon v. Willing, 20 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1937) ; In re Erie Trust Co.,
20 Erie 83 (Pa. C.P. 1938).
9 See Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super. 452, 455, 36 A.2d
242, 243 (1944); RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 58, comment d (1959).
10 See 36 MIcH. L. REv. 517 (1938) ; 86 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1938).
"1 See Ingel's Estate, 372 Pa. 171, 174, 92 A.2d 881, 882 (1952).
12 See Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v. Giordano, 154 Pa. Super. 452, 36 A.2d 242
(1943).
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often appear as substitutes for wills.'" Under section 11 of the Estates
Act of 1947,: 4 Pennsylvania allows the surviving spouse of a depositor
to reach such an account as part of his or her statutory share." In
applying these provisions to tentative trusts, the case law treats
such trusts as illusory transfers conveying no vested rights. The
court in Graham Estate"0 stated that section 11 applies to tentative
trusts because the depositor retains a power of revocation, and in
Krasney Estate " the court allowed a surviving wife to reach the de-
posit on three alternative grounds, one of which was that section 11
allows a surviving spouse to treat a tentative trust as a testamentary
disposition.
Although section 11 is not retroactive in its application,', one
recent lower court opinion "9 holds that it applies to a tentative trust
created prior to the effective date of the act because the conveyance
became effective at the death of the depositor, after the act, rather than
at the time of creation. Since the basis for allowing a spouse to reach
the account under the Pennsylvania common-law rules is that the
transfer creates no vested rights, it may be unnecessary to apply the
statute retroactively in tentative trust cases. However, the courts have
recognized the inchoate character of beneficiaries' rights in savings
account trusts.2 °
It would seem that Pennsylvania applies the better rule in allow-
ing the spouse to elect against a tentative trust. Although a depositor
should be allowed to transfer assets at his death without the formalities
of estate administration, he should not be permitted to use a savings
deposit as a means of defeating the strong public policy protecting his
spouse's claim to her statutory share and accomplishing with a tenta-
tive trust something he could not do with a will.
C. Rights of Taxing Authorities
The old Pennsylvania Transfer Inheritance Tax Act 2 taxed prop-
erty transferred by a decedent "when the transfer is . . made in
13 See Leapheart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 626,
637 (1930).
14 PA. STAT. ANi. tit. 20, § 301.11 (Supp. 1961).
'5 Compare Vache Estate, 9 Fid. Rep. 465 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959) (widow
could not take against "in trust" account, although taking against will, because she
did not file under § 11).
16 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 218 (Orphans' Ct. 1954).
17 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 450, 456-59 (Orphans' Ct. 1957). The same reasoning was
used by the court in Williams Estate, 12 Fid. Rep. 285 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1962),
where the court permitted the husband of a decedent to receive his "family exemption"
as well as his statutory share from the proceeds of a tentative trust.
Is See, e.g., Iafolla Estate, 380 Pa. 391, 396, 110 A.2d 380, 382 (1955); Bullock
Estate, 79 Pa. D. & C. 389, 393 (Orphans' Ct. 1951).
19 Krasney Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 450 (Orphans' Ct. 1957); see Iafolla
Estate, supra note 18, at 396, 110 A.2d at 382-83 (dictum).
20 See cases cited notes 16-17 supra.
21 Pa. Laws 1919, act 521, § 1.
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contemplation of . . . death . . . or intended to take effect in pos-
session or enjoyment at or after . . . death." It further provided a
rebuttable presumption that transfers made within a year of death
were "made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this
clause." The courts have held tentative trusts taxable under this
language.22
The Commissioner's comment to section 226 of the Inheritance and
Estate Tax Act of 1961 2 (effective January 1, 1962) states that the
new statute is consistent with the existing case law. It taxes such trans-
fers where the decedent "has, at his death, either in himself alone, or in
conjunction with any person not having an adverse interest, a power to
alter, amend or revoke the interest of the beneficiary .... 2 4
If the savings account trust remains subject to the absolute control
of the depositor-that is, so long as it remains a tentative trust-, the
interest earned on the account is includible in the depositor's taxable
income 5 Similarly, under section 2038 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, the decedent's gross estate will include a savings account trust
whenever it is still "tentative" at the time of death.
When a' testator directs that his residuary estate bear all taxes
on the legacies given in his will, such a direction will not relieve the
beneficiary of a tentative trust account from payment of the federal
and state taxes levied on the estate by reason of the trust. 6
If the funds of an "in trust" account are taxable to the depositor's
estate under federal or state law, the personal representative of the
depositor is under a duty to report the account on the appropriate re-
turn.2 7 Further, since it is part of the responsibility of a personal
representative to gather the assets of the estate over which he has
charge, he should inquire into the background of any "in trust" de-
posit maintained by the decedent in order to ascertain whether such
funds are properly includible in the estate. In some cases, this may
obligate the personal representative to block the account by notifying
the bank as provided in the Banking Code9 and either to post the
necessary bond or to obtain the court order required by that statute.
2 2 Doherty Estate, 12 Fid. Rep. 185 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1961) ; Peterman's Estate,
56 Pa. D. & C. 365 (Orphans' Ct. 1946) ; Kress Estate, 92 Pittsb. 553 (Pa. Orphans'
Ct. 1943); Flannery's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 165 (Orphans' Ct. 1938).
23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-226 (Supp. 1961). It would seem that this
language modifies the Pennsylvania rule with regard to taxation of revocable trusts.
24 See Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924) (power to revoke or
amend in settlor alone).
25 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671, 676. Conversely, it seems likely that
no gift tax would be due because no taxable transfer has been made.
26 See Kyle Estate, 1 Fid. Rep. 131 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1947).
27 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2002; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 2485-701, -731
(Supp. 1961).
28 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.501 (1950).
29 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 8f9-905 (1939).
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II. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS
The institution in which an "in trust" account is maintained
normally has two general desires with respect to such accounts-that
the purposes and intentions of the depositor be honored and that
liability for wrongful payment of funds be avoided. The Banking
Code, the Building and Loan and Savings and Loan Laws, and the
contractual arrangements between bank and depositor provide the
basis for discussion in this area.
A. The Statutes
The Banking Code sets forth a bank's rights and duties in the
handling of "in trust" accounts. Under section 904,"° the bank "may"
pay the funds of such an account to the named beneficiary "upon satis-
factory proof of the death of the person . . . described as trustee,"
provided that the bank has received no notice in writing "of the
existence and terms of a valid trust [other] than such [as] . . . shall
have been given in writing" to the bank. Under section 905A, 1 the
bank is permitted to disregard notices of adverse claims to accounts
unless the notice is in the form of a restraining order or attachment
or accompanied by a bond "acceptable" to the bank indemnifying it
"from any liability, loss, damage, costs or expenses on account of the
payment of such adverse claim or the dishonor of the check or other
order of the . . . person to whose credit the deposit stands on the
books of the institution." Section 905A applies to all situations ex-
cept those in which "the person to whose credit the deposit stands is
a fiduciary for such adverse claimant" and in which claimant gives to
the bank his affidavit stating "the facts constituting such [fiduciary]
relationship, as well as the facts showing reasonable cause of belief
that such fiduciary is about to misappropriate the deposit
" 32
Such statutory announcements allow banks to rely upon their
records in all cases except those in which they are in receipt of notice
in proper form that there is an adverse claim to the fund in question.
Where such notice is given, the bank can bring the adverse parties into
court and have the ownership of the funds decided by judicial action.
3
Or, if the bank has reason to believe that the claimant is not the
s0 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-904 (1939).
3
1 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-905A (1939).
32 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-905B (1939).
33 See Vierling v. Ellwood City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 356 Pa. 350, 52 A.2d
224 (1947); Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 54 At. 994 (1903); Waltman v.
Germantown Trust Co., 92 Pa. Super. 480 (1928); cf. lafolla Estate, 380 Pa. 391,
110 A.2d 380 (1955).
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proper person to receive the funds, it may refuse to pay even though
it would be protected against mispayment by the provisions of section
904 of the Banking CodeO4  On the other hand, payment in dis-
regard of the proper notice of adverse claims may result in liability to
the true owner of the fundV5
Similar provisions apply to federal savings and loan associa-
tions " and to building and loan associations."7  They permit the
association to rely on its records and provide that after the member's
death a receipt from the beneficiary of record-provided the bene-
ficiary is not less than sixteen years old-"shall be a full, complete and
valid release of the . . . association from any further liability of the
accounts so paid."
B. The Olney Bank & Trust Case
In most cases a bank would be justified in paying the fund to
the executor of its "trustee" depositor. In the Olney Bank & Trust
Case,' the claimant, record beneficiary of an "in trust" account created
by a deceased depositor, attempted to hold the bank for wrongful pay-
ment of the account to the administrator of the depositor's estate. In
denying this claim, the court rested its decision upon two grounds-
"the general rule . . . that upon the death of a trustee of personal
property . . . where no successor has been appointed by the proper
court, the property held in trust goes to the personal representative of
the deceased trustee [in trust]," " and the bank rule that "the legal
representative or successor of the decedent shall alone be entitled to
receive payment and his or their receipt with the production of the
deposit book will be in full discharge to the bank." 40 The opinion
could be supported on either of these grounds.41 There might be some
question as to the ruling if such a bank rule were not involved when
one considers that the bank has a perfectly safe course under section
904 of the Banking Code and by interpleader.
Speculation as to the result of the Olney Bank & Trust Case
decision had the claimant been the administrator and the bank had
defended a payment to the record beneficiary by asserting the per-
34 See Miller v. Beneficial Say. Fund Soc'y, 36 Pa. D. & C. 304 (C.P. 1939).
3 5 See Downey v. Duquesne City Bank, 146 Pa. Super. 289, 22 A2d 124 (1941);
Waltman v. Germantown Trust Co., 92 Pa. Super. 480, 485 (1928); ef. Gaffney's
Estate, 146 Pa. 49, 23 Ati. 163 (1892).
36 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1081.3 (1958).
37 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-610 (Supp. 1961).
38 116 Pa. Super. 438, 176 At. 837 (1935).
39 Id. at 441, 176 Atl. at 837.
4 1 Id. at 442, 176 Ati. at 839.
41 Ibid.
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missive provisions of section 904 of the Banking Code proves interest-
ing. The administrator could argue that, notwithstanding the stat-
ute, the bank rules constitute a contract between it and its depositor
that it would pay only the depositor or his representative. Payment
to the beneficiary breaches this contract and results in a loss to the
estate. Under such reasoning, the bank in the Olney Bank & Trust
Case was not only justified in paying the administrator, but might not
have been safe in paying the beneficiary except pursuant to a court
order. While the case may thus create an inference that a bank's rules
can alter the effect of the statutory provisions permitting payment to
the record beneficiary, such rules would not justify a bank in paying
in defiance of proper notice of an adverse claim.42
Once the bank has paid over the funds in accordance with section
904, it cannot later be required to pay them into court, for such pay-
ment ends the bank's responsibilities. But such payment would not
affect the rights of other persons to the fund in the hands of the
beneficiary."
C. Notification and Payment
There seems to be no duty imposed on a bank to notify a bene-
ficiary of the death of an "in trust" depositor. The bank has no
obligation to do anything but wait until it is approached by the bene-
ficiary or the depositor's personal representative 5
Upon notification by the beneficiary or the personal representative
of the death of the depositor, the bank ordinarily could pay the funds
to the beneficiary in accordance with the "permissive" statutes or hold
them subject to determination of the rights to the account4 Under
certain circumstances, it might be justified in paying the funds to the
personal representative.47 The statutory provision that after the de-
positor's death the amounts on deposit "shall be . . . paid to the
person or persons for whose benefit" the shares were purchased 48
places building and loan and federal savings and loan associations in a
slightly different position. This mandatory payment provision makes
it dangerous for the association to pay funds to the member's exec-
42 See cases cited note 35 supra.
48Del Conte v. Luca, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 130, 135 (C.P. 1954).
44 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRusTs § 58, comment f (1959).
45 But see § 742 of the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act of 1961, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 72, §2485-742 (Supp. 1961), which obligates banks to report the existence of
"in trust" accounts for inheritance tax purposes.
46 Miller v. Beneficial Say. Fund Soc'y, 36 Pa. D. & C. 304 (C.P. 1939).
47 See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
48 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-610 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1081.3 (1958).
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utor since it may also be required to pay the beneficiary if he presents
adequate identification and proof of age to the association.
It should be noted that the Banking Code requires that the bene-
ficiary be paid unless the bank is given "notice of the existence and
terms of a valid trust [other] than such description [of the depositor in
trust for another] . . . in writing." " The relevant provisions relat-
ing to building and loan and federal savings and loan associations
contain no express requirement that such notice of other trust terms
be in writing.50 In order to avoid possible demands by persons who
claim benefits under unwritten notice of trust provisions, associations
should (a) instruct their employees to channel any such notice to a
responsible officer of the association who is required to reduce the
new designation to writing and (b) have a rule paraphrasing the pro-
visions of the Banking Code as to writings and make the rule binding
on the member by a reference to it in the passbook, share certificate,
or signature card.
D. Passbooks: "Receipt or Acquittance"
There seem to be no requirements in the Banking Code relating
to the issuance of passbooks, and it appears that the use of a passbook
is discretionary with the bank. So far as the beneficiary's claims are
concerned, a bank is empowered to pay out on the beneficiary's "check,
order, or receipt, as the case may be" upon proof of the death of the
depositor.5 Thus it seems clear that where the funds are in a bank,
the beneficiary may claim the account without presenting any pass-
book, and the bank is within its rights in paying the funds to him. The
same is true as to federal savings and loan associations, so far as they
may be controlled in these matters by Pennsylvania law. They are
permitted to pay out upon the "receipt or acquittance" of the
beneficiary.52
Similarly, the Building and Loan Code provides for payments to
the beneficiary upon his "receipt or acquittance." ' But this code re-
quires that when the funds are withdrawn, "the original certificate
shall be surrendered . . . for cancellation." ' This language raises
some question as to payments made solely upon the "receipt or acquit-
tance" of a beneficiary. However, a building and loan association
probably would be justified in paying without surrender of the share
49 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-904 (1939).
So See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-610 (Supp. 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1081.3 (1958).5 1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-904 (1939).
52 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1081.3 (1958).
53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-610 (Supp. 1961).
54 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-607 (1958).
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certificate either on the fact that the code elsewhere speaks of payments
of the withdrawal value or maturity value and not of the surrender of
the shares or on the fact that the intention of the first provision men-
tioned is to enable the beneficiary to obtain the funds solely on his
signature.
E. Voting of Shares
Section 506 of the Building and Loan Code " provides that when
a fiduciary who holds shares of a building and loan association in
trust is appointed other than by will or by a decree of the orphans'
court, the shares "may be voted by such fiduciary . . . either in
person or by proxy." In the cases excepted above, the shares are to
be voted "in the manner and under the circumstances provided by
law." In the typical "in trust" case, in which the "trustee" appoints
himself, he may vote the shares. This is the only logical result, for
otherwise the association would deny the shareholder's vote to a per-
son who, so far as it is concerned, owns the account and can reduce,
close, or otherwise deal with it as he pleases. It is somewhat doubtful
that a holder of an "in trust" share certificate is a fiduciary within the
meaning of section 506 or within the common-law meaning of fidu-
ciary. The existence of the certificate implies that the shareholder has
all rights of ownership until his death-and possibly thereafter if his
will so provides. Thus the beneficiary's rights in such an "in trust"
certificate would be far different from the rights of a beneficiary under
a will or deed of trust.
F. Using Name or Funds of Another
When a depositor creates an "in trust" account, using his own
funds but giving an assumed name as trustee in trust for an existing
third person, the account is treated as though the depositor had
opened it in his own name.5 The use of an assumed name does not
vary or affect the application of the usual tentative trust rules.
However, the use of an assumed name may create difficulties of
proof. Even after the depositor has died without disturbing the
tentative trust, the beneficiary is not able to reach the fund until it has
been shown that the depositor has created that account for himself
under an assumed name rather than as a gift to the person bearing the
assumed name. In one case,57 such a showing was based on proof of
-55 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074 (1958), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1074-3
to -1112 (Supp. 1961).
56 Migut Estate, 30 Luzerne 38 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1935).
57 Ibid.
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the understanding of the bank employees and officers that the de-
positor had adopted the assumed name for the purpose of the account
and further proof that he had a safe deposit box also under the assumed
name. Even with such proof, the court required notice to the person
whose name was used as the assumed name.
The deposit of money rightfully belonging to another in an "in
trust" account does not prevent the true owner from reaching the
funds so deposited."8 However, the depository may pay the funds to
the depositor or even seize the account for its claim against the de-
positor unless it has knowledge that the funds on deposit belong to
someone other than the depositor.r9
III. TREATMENT OF SPECIAL GRouPs
A. The Position of Minors
Pennsylvania statutes permit-or require-banks, building and
loan associations, and federal savings and loan associations to deal with
minor beneficiaries and depositors.
A depository subject to the Pennsylvania Banking Code 6 may,
pursuant to section 902 thereof, receive deposits in the name of a
minor.6 This section states that the bank "shall" pay out the funds
so deposited upon receipt of the minor depositor's "proper check, order,
or receipt, as the case may be, without the assent of [the minor's]
parent or guardian." Curiously, the provision seemingly applies re-
gardless of the age of the minor depositor. Members subject to the
Pennsylvania Building and Loan Code or the Pennsylvania statutes
relating to federal savings and loan associations are similarly situated
save that in these cases the minor need not be paid on his own order
if he is less than twelve years of age.0
All of these statutory provisions apply when a minor deposits
funds "in trust." When funds are deposited "in trust" for a minor,
slightly different rules apply. Section 904 of the Banking Code '
provides that when a bare "in trust" account-one in which the bank
58 Thus, in Drusbasky v. Drusbasky, 83 Pittsb. 489 (Pa. C.P. 1935), a son was
able to compel his mother to account for money earned by him after coming of legal
age and turned over to her and deposited by her in an account "in trust" for him.
And in Bibby v. Bibby, 241 Pa. 175, 88 Atl. 416 (1913), a husband was able to reach
funds "in trust" in his wife's name for his children when he was able to show that
the funds came from the sale of property belonging solely to him.
59 See Downey v. Duquesne City Bank, 146 Pa. Super. 289, 22 A.2d 124 (1941).
60 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, 8 819-904 (1939).
6 1 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-902 (1939).
62 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-608 (Supp. 1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1081.1 (1958).
63 PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 7, § 819 (1939), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7,
§§819-2 to -1506 (1961).
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has received no notice of a different arrangement than the customary
savings account trust-is maintained in a bank, the bank "may," upon
proof of the death of the depositor, pay the funds to the person named
as beneficiary of the account. This provision, together with section
902, permits the bank to pay to a minor beneficiary, regardless of age,
upon proof of the death of the depositor-trustee. 4 Even though it
would be fully protected if it paid the minor directly, the permissive
language used in section 904 permits the bank to refuse to pay the
minor and insist on the appointment of a guardian to receive the
funds. 5
Section 610 of the Building and Loan Code 6 and section 3 of the
Act of June 24, 1939 govern payments to minor beneficiaries of "in
trust" accounts maintained in building and loan and federal savings
and loan associations. Both provisions state that the association
"shall" pay "dividends or earnings" and "withdrawal or maturity
value" to a minor beneficiary if the "in trust" designation is the only
notice of the trust given to the association; hence the associations are
both required to pay and protected completely from claims of third
parties.
The use in the Banking Code of permissive language and the
corresponding use of mandatory language in the statutes governing
associations indicates a legislative intention to restrict associations
more than banks. Although insistence on a guardian might be of some
benefit to the minor involved, an association would assume a risk of
liability for damages which might be incurred by a minor while he
was unable to reach his funds.
Pennsylvania's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act 6 provides a new
means by which a gift may be made to a minor. It does not, however,
replace the "in trust" savings account method of making a gift. Gifts
under the act are not testamentary in character, are carefully hedged
with conditions, and are not subject to revocation. The donative con-
cept in the Uniform Act is, in general, contrary and inapposite to the
purposes of a depositor who creates a tentative trust. The typical de-
positor of an "in trust" account is making a testamentary disposition,
retaining to himself during his lifetime all the attributes of ownership
of the account. He does not intend to create an irrevocable interest in
the beneficiary when he opens the account. On the other hand, a gift
pursuant to the Uniform Act can eliminate some of the uncertainties of
"in trust" savings deposits-for example, creditors and spouse reach-
6 See Miller v. Beneficial Say. Fund Soc'y, 36 Pa. D. & C. 307 (C.P. 1939).
65 Ibid.
66 PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, § 1074-610 (Supp. 1961).
67 PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 20, §§ 3601-11 (Supp. 1961).
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ing the funds, inadvertent revocation, and possible withdrawals by the
beneficiary before a specified date. However, the statute is not a sub-
stitute for a tentative trust. It merely gives a prospective donor an
additional vehicle by which he can make a gift; the vehicle selected de-
pends on the intentions and purposes of the donor and the method
best-suited to accomplish, them.
B. Incompetent Depositors
When a depositor becomes incompetent, several problems arise
as to the disposition of the funds: (1) the right of the guardian to
revoke the tentative trust and bring the account into the incompetent's
general estate, (2) the responsibility of the fund for the living expenses
of the incompetent and his family, and (3) the guardian's responsi-
bility to safeguard the account.
The rules of the cases concerning the first two problems are sum-
marized, albeit somewhat narrowly, in the Restatement of Trusts,'s
under which rule the funds may be used only with the permission
of the proper court and for the welfare of the depositor. Other au-
thorities extend this to include the needs of the depositor's family and
his burial expenses.69 The guardian's duty to safeguard the "in trust"
account appears to require nothing more than holding the passbook in
a safe place and thereby maintaining the status quo.7"
C. Tentative Trusts for Charitable Purposes
The rules relating to savings accounts "in trust" for individuals
generally apply to like accounts for charities.7" Moreover, tentative
trusts for charities are subject to any restrictions relating generally to
charitable gifts, inter vivos or testamentary. For example, in Penn-
sylvania any tentative trust established within thirty days of the de-
positor's death and naming a charity as beneficiary is probably void
since such a transaction is clearly a "gift . . . made to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the donor . ,, .
And it seems that if revocable trusts-which actually involve some
present transfer of property subject to recapture-violate restrictions
on charitable gifts by will, tentative trusts are equally repugnant. 7
68 See RESTATEMEN4T (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 58, comment c- (1959).
69 See In re Derr, 83 Pa. D. & C. 603 (C.P. 1952) ; In re Mines, 31 Pa. D. & C.
153 (C.P. 1937) (dictum); Young v. Dollar Say. Bank, 25 Pa. D. & C. 80 (C.P.
1935) (dictum) ; 1 ScowT, TRUSTS § 58.4, at 494 (2d ed. 1956). But see In re Newtdrk,
27 Pa. D. & C. 675 (C.P. 1936).
70 Cf. Young v. Dollar Say. Bank, supra note 69; In re Newkirk, supra note 69.
7' See 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 361-62 (2d ed. 1956).
72 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 17 (Supp. 1961).
73 See 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 362.6, at 2612-13 (2d ed. 1956).
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